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JUDGING FEDERAL REGULATIONS THAT PREEMPT
STATE LAW: THE ROLE OF THE PRESUMPTION
AGAINST PREEMPTION*
Charles G. Cole**
In dealing with questions of federal preemption, appellate
lawyers often find themselves addressing the presumption
against preemption-the principle that a federal statute-'vill not
be held to have preempted state law unless that is the clear and
manifest intent of Congress. But suppose the preemption
question arises in the administrative context, when a federal
agency adopts a rule that expands its jurisdiction far enough to
preempt state power over a field traditionally regulated by the
states. Should the appellate specialist look to that presumption in
deciding whether the agency's rule fell within its statutory
power? Or would the courts use other tools of statutory
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interpretation, including the Chevron doctrine,' in deciding
whether the rule was permissible?
The Supreme Court shed significant light on this question
during the last term. In New York v. FERC,2 it held that the
presumption against preemption would not determine whether
an agency had authority to adopt a regulation asserting greater
jurisdiction, even if the rule's effect would be to displace the
historic power of states to regulate in a particular area. This
decision represented the latest of several refusals to extend the
presumption to the administrative context, and effectively frees
federal agencies from its constraints in interpreting their organic
statutes.
The presumption against preemption has a revered
pedigree. For at least a century, courts analyzing whether state
law has been displaced pursuant to the Supremacy Clause have
"start[ed] with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 3 Though
many more courts quote this principle than actually apply it,4 the
cases citing it are legion. It has often been applied in cases of
implied preemption, particularly in determining whether a field
has been preempted by federal law.5 It has also been appliedover some vigorous dissents-in cases of express preemption, as

1. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84244 (1984) (indicating that administrative regulations promulgated to fill legislative gaps
will be given "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute" ).
2. 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
3. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Reid v. Colo., 187 U.S.
137, 148 (1902).
4. E.g. Cal. v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 497 (1990) (quoting presumption but finding
preemption); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting presumption
but finding preemption); Napier v. A. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (.1926)
(noting presumption but finding preemption); Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. 227 (1859)
(noting presumption but finding preemption). See generally Viet Dinh, Reassessing the
Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L. J. 2085, 2104-05 (2000) (questioning impact of
presumption in obstacle preemption cases).
5. E.g. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); Cal. v. ARC Am. Corp., 490
U.S. 93, 101 (1989); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S.
707 (1985).
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a principle limiting the construction of congressional directions
about preemption.6
Thus, the presumption appeared to be a weapon of some
power when, in New York v. FERC,7 New York and the other
petitioning states invoked it to challenge a FERC rule asserting
jurisdiction over a substantial segment of retail electrical
transmission service. The petitioners pointed out that, after the
passage of the Federal Power Act in 1935, local utilities had
provided transmission service to retail customers as part of their
sales of electricity, and that states had therefore historically
regulated all aspects of such retail sales. When, in the last
decade, a growing number of states began to permit or require
utilities to unbundle their transmission services, FERC had
stepped in to claim jurisdiction over the unbundled transmission
services associated with retail sales, inserting federal regulators
into a field that had until then traditionally been the province of
the states. The petitioning states claimed that FERC's 1996 rule 9
about unbundled retail transmission had gone too far-that
FERC had exceeded its statutory authority under the Federal
Power Act by invading this area.'° To the surprise of many in the
industry, the Supreme Court granted their petition, as well as a
competing petition from Enron asking for even greater FERC
jurisdiction.
The petitioning States made the presumption against
preemption one of the centerpieces of their brief. They presented
what seemed to be a simple syllogism: They began with the
general proposition that the presumption permits preemption
only where it can be shown that it was the "clear and manifest
purpose" " of Congress to displace state law. Then, they pointed
out that retail transmission, as a service distinct from a sale, did
not exist when the Federal Power Act was enacted. Thus, they
concluded, no showing of a clear and manifest congressional
6. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992).
7. See 535 U.S. 1.
8. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c.
9. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open-Access Non-Discriminatory
TransmissionServices by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540, 21624-21627, 21725-21732
(May 10, 1996).
10. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b).
II. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 715 (quoting Jones, 430 U.S. at 525).
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purpose to preempt could be made in this case, and any assertion
of federal jurisdiction over this type of service would
be
2
inconsistent with the presumption against preemption.'
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this theory.
Drawing on briefs filed by the Solicitor General and the Edison
Electric Institute, Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court
contained a separate section entitled "The Presumption against
Pre-emption." '" He explained there that federal preemption of
state law can raise two quite different types of legal questions.
The first is "whether a given state authority conflicts with, and
thus has been displaced by, the existence of Federal Government
authority." 14 In that situation, he observed, the Court starts with
the well-established presumption against preemption.'5
The second type of question, however, arises "when a
controversy concerned ...
the scope of the Federal
Government's authority to displace state action." 16 Such a
situation, the Court reasoned, does not involve the presumption
against preemption, "but rather requires us to be certain that
Congress has conferred authority on the agency." "7Looking to
its earlier decision in Louisiana Public Service Commission v.
FCC,'8 the Court concluded that
a federal agency may preempt state law only when and if it
is acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated
authority [,] ... [for] an agency literally has no power to
act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a
sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power
upon it.
/
Moreover, "the best way to answer such a question-i.e.,
whether federal power may be exercised in an area of preexisting state regulation-'is to examine the nature and scope of
the authority granted by Congress to the agency.' 20 Thus, "we
12. See Br. of Petr. at 11-17, N.Y. v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (summary of argument

and standard of review) (available on LEXIS at 2000 U.S. Briefs 568).
13. 535 U. S. at 17-20.
14. Id. at 17-18.
15. Id. at 18.
16. Id. at 17.
17. Id. at 18.
18. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
19. N.Y v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 18 (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Commn., 476 U.S. at 374).
20. Id. (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Commn., 476 U.S. at 374).
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must interpret the statute to determine whether Congress has
given FERC the power to act as it has, and we do so without any
presumption one way or the other."2
While the Court cited only Louisiana Public Service as
authority for this conclusion, it was in fact foreshadowed b
other decisions. In the relatively early United States v. Shimer,
the Court upheld a federal regulation that displaced state law,
observing that, as long as the agency's choice
represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies that were committed to the agency's care by the
statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the
statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is

not one that Congress would have sanctioned.23
Again in Fidelity FederalSavings & Loan Association v. De La
Cuesta,4 the Court upheld a federal regulation that preempted
state commercial law without giving any weight to the
presumption, pointing out instead that "[a] pre-emptive
regulation's force does not depend on express congressional
authorization to displace state law." 25 The court's inquiry is thus
limited to "whether [the agency's pre-emptive] action is within
the scope of [its] delegated authority." 26
Neither of these earlier cases, however, explicitly referred
to the presumption. In Smiley v. Citibank South Dakota, N.A., 21
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, explicitly refused
to apply it in determining the validity of an OCC regulation that
authorized national banks to charge late-payment fees and hence
preempted state laws prohibiting banks from imposing and
collecting those fees. The question was whether the statutory
authority over "interest" encompassed these late-payment fees.
The petitioner had argued that the presumption "in effect trumps
Chevron, and requires a court to make its own interpretation...
that will avoid (to the extent possible) pre-emption of state
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
23. Id. at 383.
24. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
25. Id. at 154.
26. Id. Accord City of N.Y. v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988) (" [T]he correct focus is on the
federal agency that seeks to displace state law and on the proper bounds of its lawful
authority to undertake such action.").
27. 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
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law." 2 The Court reasoned, however, that this "confuses the
question of the substantive (as opposed to pre-emptive) meaning
of a statute with the question of whether a statute is preemptive." 29 The Court assumed that the latter question could be
decided de novo by the courts, but sustained the agency's
substantive interpretation on a Chevron rationale. °
New York v. FERC represents a step beyond Smiley. In
Smiley, the agency's regulation essentially reflected a change in
a specific substantive rule, not in the scope of the agency's

jurisdiction or field preemption." In New York v. FERC, on the
other hand, the agency was interpreting its basic jurisdictional
grant. The scope of that provision broadly determined both the
scope of the agency's power and the remaining area left for state
regulation. Thus, the effect of New York v. FERC is to hold the
presumption inappropriate even where the agency was
interpreting the scope of its own powers, with the inevitable
displacement of a field of state law.
This rejection of the presumption against preemption is
significant for several reasons. It appeared in an opinion penned
by a Justice who had been a principal proponent of the
presumption. 2 It was endorsed by the entire Court. And it
reflected a general rule: In the "sort of case we confront heredefining the proper scope of the federal power," 33 the reach of
the agency's jurisdiction under its organic statute would be
determined by traditional tools of statutory construction, but not
by the presumption against preemption.
The holding in New York v. FERC, though novel, has a
sound constitutional underpinning. The presumption against
preemption is a means of implementing the Supremacy Clause.34
28. Id. at 743-44.
29. Id. at 744 (emphasis in original).
30. Id. at 744-45.
31. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79

Tex. L.Rev. 1321, 1434, 1437 (2001).
32. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484-486; Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 518, 523. See also
Jones v. U.S., 529 U.S. 848, 912-13 (2000) (Stevens & Thomas, JJ, concurring)

(characterizing presumption against preemption as "well-established"); Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (Stevens, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ,
dissenting) ("I respectfully dissent from ... the Court's unprecedented extension of the
doctrine of pre-emption").
33. N.Y. v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 18.
34. U.S. Const. art. vi, cl. 2.
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That clause is essentially a choice-of-law provision: It tells the
courts which rule of law-state or federal-to apply when the
two appear to be in conflict or repugnant to one another." As a
choice-of-law provision, the Supremacy Clause does not provide
any direction as to "the nature and scope of the authority
granted by Congress to the agency." 36 By the same token, the
presumption against preemption, designed as a tool for
implementing the Supremacy Clause, addresses whether federal
and state laws are in conflict, not whether a federal agency is
within its powers.
The Court's rejection of the presumption against
preemption in New York v. FERC has already had an impact in a
very different setting. American Civil Liberties Union of New
Jersey, Inc. v. County of Hudson37 addressed whether the public

had a right to compel disclosure of the identities and other
information concerning the many post-September 11 detainees
held in New Jersey jails by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. The state trial court ordered disclosure pursuant to state
law. Five days later, the INS promulgated, without either notice
or an opportunity for prior public comment, a rule that barred
disclosure of information concerning INS detainees held in
county jails.38 Although this regulation arguably intruded into
aspects of the state's police power, New Jersey's Appellate
Division reversed, finding on the authority of New York v. FERC
that the presumption against preemption was inapplicable:
"When determining whether an agency acted within the scope
of its authority in promulgating a regulation, courts do not
invoke a presumption against pre-emption." 3 9
As County of Hudson demonstrates, the presumption
against preemption will not define the authority of a federal
35. See e.g. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225 (2000); Paul D. Clement &
Viet D. Dinh, When Uncle Sam Steps In-There's No Real Disharmony between High
Court Decisions Backing Pre-emption and the Federalism Push of Recent Years, 23 Leg.
Times 66 (June 19, 2000).
36. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 18 (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Commn., 476 U.S. at
374).
37. 799 A.2d 629 (N.J. App. Div. 2002), cert. denied, 803 A.2d 1162 (N.J. 2002).
38. Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Naturalization Service
Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 19508 (Apr. 22, 2002) (interim rule)
(effective Apr. 17, 2002).
39. 799 A.2d at 647 (citing New York v. FERC).
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agency. However, another doctrine may achieve some of the
same goals where a federal agency appears to be overreaching.
In Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers,40 the Court rejected an agency rule that asserted
Clean Water Act jurisdiction over all ponds used by migratory
birds. The rule raised "significant constitutional questions"' 4, as
to the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
The Court therefore reasoned that " [w]here an administrative
interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress'
power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that
result.", 42 This alternate presumption is rooted in the Court's
"prudential desire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues
and our assumption that Congress does not casually authorize
administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of
congressional authority."4 3 Thus, where an agency's
interpretation of its powers displaces state law to the extent that
it actually pushes the constitutional envelope, the presumption
against an expansive statutory interpretation might be an
effective means of curbing its reach.
In sum, those who address on appeal the validity of federal
regulations must recognize that the protean power of a federal
agency to shape its own jurisdiction is no longer, if it has ever
been, bounded by the presumption against preemption. It is
limited instead by the express terms of the agency's organic
statute, the reasonableness of the agency's construction of the
statute, and the need to avoid constitutionally questionable
federal incursions into areas reserved to the states. Appellate
review of the validity of federal agency regulations displacing
local law must proceed on the basis of traditional tools of
statutory construction (including the Chevron doctrine), not on
the basis of a presumption designed for evaluating the validity of
the state laws themselves.

40.
41.
42.
43.

531 U.S. 159 (2001).
Id. at 174.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 172-73.

